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From Surrogates to Storit's: 
The Evolution of Federal Merg·er Policy 
by Robert H. Lamie ami James Lallgellfeld 
F
rom its modcrn origins more 
than thirty years ago federal 
merger policy has centered 
around the use of standard sur-
rogates for market power to make pre-
sumptions ahout the likely effects of 
mergers. Since that time it has been evolv-
ing towards an increasingly complex 
approach as economic considerations 
have cxpanded their influence on merger 
policy. This trend was solidified in Ihe 
19X2 revision of the Departmcnt of 
Justice's Merger Guidelines, accelerated 
by the Department of Justice amI Federal 
Tradc Commission 1992 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines' increascd emphasis 
on unilateral (as opposed to collusive) 
anticompetitive effects,' and has reached 
new heights in the last two years with new 
unilateral theories and the application of 
econometric analysis of market data and 
game-theory hased simulation programs. 
In effect, mcrger policy has been moving 
away from rcliance on surrogates and 
towards an approach that instead tclls a 
story of anticompetitive harm-an 
approach that directly asks ami answers 
the ultimate question: are prices to con-
sumers likely to increase as a rcsult of a 
merger'? This new approach can lead to 
slllprising conclusions. 
The Traditiomd Approach 
UllilCd SlalC,\' I'. Phi/ai/('//,hia Naliolla/ 
/Jallk, 374 U.S. 321 (1%3). one of the 
first modern merger cases.~ held that the 
government must define the rclevantmar-
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ket and prove appropriate market share 
and market concentration data. I I' the gov-
enunent proved these surrogates for mar-
ket power, the Suoreme Court was willing 
to declare a PI'l':,umption of illegality that 
would control unless defendant "clearly" 
could overcome it. Id. at 363. Once the 
government had defined the relevant mar-
ket and showed an appropriate increase in 
concentration, the case was virtually over 
and the merger would be enjoined,' 
As we have learned over the last thir-
ty years. the traditional approach has 
many problems. For example. market 
definition can be an all or nothing game 
and can determine whether a merger will 
be challenged. Suppo;.e, for example, that 
two manufacturers of luxury automo-
biles, such as Mercedes and BMW, want 
to merge. If the "relevant market" were 
considered to be "all new automobiles,'" 
the merger would probably be regarded 
as harmless since their market shares 
would be trivial. On the other hand, if 
there were such a thing as a "luxury car 
markct," the merger might involve undu-
ly high market shares and could thus be 
challenged and prevented, Unfortunately. 
the methods for and evidence of market 
determination seldom lead to unambigu-
ous market definitions, 
Accordingly. the conventional 
approach can lead to little predictability 
in "heterogeneous" or "di fferentiated" 
markets composed of products with sub-
stantially different features and prices. 
such as automobiles. or with significant 
hrand distinction and (arguably) less 
obvious product differences. such as hath 
tissues. This problem can be serious 
because one can almost always find 
enough differences in products to make 
an argument that any market is heteroge-
neous. The traditional approach to this 
problem. at least prior to the 1992 Hori-
zontal Merger Guidelines. was to decide 
how close the products of the merging 
finns arc in a product market space. and 
make this a qualitative "plus" or "minus" 
factor in the analysis. 
Another problem with Phi/adelphia 
Naliolla//Jallk's presumptive approach is 
that every merger involves different com-
petitive circumstances that can affect 
whether a merger is likely to reduce com-
petition. Even if one can establish that a 
merger would result in a post-merger 
industry Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(1·11·11) over IXOO and an increase of more 
than 100, these calculations by them-
selves seldom accurately predict whether 
competition will be harmed hy the merg-
er. For example. Ulliled SIll/Cs I'. Gellel'll/ 
DYllal/lic,\' Corp .• 415 U.S. 4X6 (1974), 
held that current production of coal was a 
poor measure of future competition and 
that uncommitted coal reserves should be 
uscd instead .. ' Cases such as Ulliled Slall',\' 
I'. !!'t/'I'le M(//wgl'lIu'III, 11Il',. 5XX F. Supp. 
49X (S,D.N.Y. 19X3). /'el"d. 743 F.2d 976 
(2d Cir. 19X4). recognized the imp0l1ance 
of potential entry as a cheek on post-
merger market power." and Ulliled Slall',\' 
I'. CO/II/II:\, l..llke Foods. 1990-2 Trade Cas. 
(CCH; ~169.113 (D. Minn. 1(90), high-
lighted the impact of powerful buyers in 
counteracting increased seller concentra-
tion aner a merger. 
Perhaps for these reasons, Phi/a-
dell,hia Naliolla/ /Jallk's presumptive 
approach has eroded over time, For exam-
ple. in Ullited Slales I'. Mal'ille /JllI/l'OI'l'-
om/ioll. /1Il'" 41 XU,S. 602. 631 (1974). 
the Supreme COUl1 rearticulated the for-
mulation, hut omitted "clearly" from the 
presumption. Moreover. even the word 
"presumption" may now be debatable. 
Recall the opinion in Ullilcd Slall's I'. 
/Jakel' lIughl',\' 11Il'" 731 F. SUpp. 3 
(D.D.C.). all"d, 90X F.2d 9XI (D.C. qr. 
1(90), in which Judge Thomas arguall1y 
abolished the presumption completely,? 
although the presumption docs remain in 
the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 
S I' U I ,\' {; I lJ 'I 7 
C 0 V E R S T () R 
Recent Government Approaches 
Regardless of whether a presumption still 
exists under case law. the federal 
enforcers today do not merely deline a 
relevant market. show the relevant 
market shares and HHI figures. and 
rest their case. Using a variety of eco-
nomic models and techniques.x federal 
enforcers are attempting to develop addi-
tional information that would shed light 
on whether a merger is likely to he anti-
competitive." 
In particular. there have heen many 
recent attempts hy the Federal Trade 
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Commission and the Department of 
Justice to shift the focus of investigations 
away from market definition. particular-
ly in cases involving unilateral effects. III 
Their approach is to return to first princi-
ples. Since the enforcers ultimately care 
about the linn's ahility to raise price after 
a merger. they look at a variety of factors 
and try directly to predict what will hap-
pen to future industry prices. 
In the extreme. this means forgetting 
about market definition. market shares. 
and other surrogates of market power. As 
Jonathan Baker and Gregory Werden sug-
gest in this issue of ANTITRlIST. so long 
as the price of something is likely to rise. 
why should we waste time figuring out 
exactly what prices will go up'? To use an 
example that Baker has used in the past. 
there might be an extreme case when we 
do not care exactly how the beer market 
is defined or what the precise market 
shares arc-e.g .• whether "lite" beer or 
imported heel' should be included in the 
relevantmarkel." If Anheuser-Busch and 
Miller were to merge and the price of 
something (even if we have not defined 
precisely what it is) probably will 
increase. then the agencies should take 
this as direct evidence of reduced com-
petition and attempt to stop the merger. 
Other antitrust scholars and practi-
tioners. such as Wenlen in this issue. 
argue that economic simulations based 
on estimates of own- and cross-price elas-
ticities of demand should be used instead 
of analysis that centers around structural 
surrogates. In fact. the government in its 
internal deliberations frequently has used 
this type of analysis to predict directly 
profit-maximizing price increases. 
At a minimum. this new method of 
analysis means an increased focus on the 
nalllre of competition between the merg-
ing finns and their close substitutes. pay-
ing par1icular attention to the likely effects 
of the merger on groups of custol11ers,l~ 
Ideology or Improved 
Economic Tools 
There is concern in the defense bar that 
economic story telling and the increased 
focus on unilateral effects analysis will 
lead to overly narrow market definitions. 
or no market definition at all. Some 
believe that the old BrOl\'ll Shol' submar-
ket concept has returned. albeit disguised 
by new economic Ianguage.1l or there is 
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an attempt to avoid the statute's reference 
to a "line of commerce." 
For example. in Ullitl'd St({tl'S I'. 
Il/tNstatl' Bakcrics e(1) .. Civ. Action 
No.: 95C 4194 (N.D. III. filed July 20. 
1995). thc government allcgcd that the 
relcvant product markct was "white pan 
bread bakcd by wholcsale and captive 
bakeries sold through retail food stores." 
ami that the mergcr "would likely cause 
Interstate to raise its prices for white pan 
bread sold undcr its hralld.l' and the 
1)/"{1IId,I' it is acquiring from Continental 
[such as Wonder or Wehers]" (emphasis 
added). According to thc Department of 
Justice. bread baked in stores' bakeries 
was not to he includcd in the same rele-
vant market as branded bread. and store-
brand white pan bread (such as Safeway). 
rolls. hearth baked. wheat. rye. diet. etc., 
hreads would be unlikely to constrain a 
price increase in branded white pan 
hreads after the merger. 
By contrast. during the Reagan 
Administration. the i'TC considered the 
same market in Flo\l"('/".I' l"dll,I'triC.l', 11/(".. 
102 ET.C. 1700 (I9!D). but alleged "[ thc] 
relevant product market for each acquisi-
tion ... is the manufacture and sale of 
brcad and bread-type rolls produccd by 
wholesale bakcries. grocery chain bak-
eries. and in-storc bakeries." wherc 
"hread shall mean white. wheat. rye. dark 
or variety baked bread products" and 
"hread-type rolls shall mean hamburger 
and hotdog rolls. brown and serve rolls. 
English muffins. hearth rolls. and similar 
products." Id. at 1701. 1705. 
Thus. market definition and competi-
tive analysis have shifted over the last 
decade. This would be desirable if the 
approach taken a decadc ago resulted in 
markets that were too broad. After all. if 
the government could show that a mcrg-
er would increase the price of "branded 
white bread" by 10 percent for a signifi-
cant period of time. then the merger 
should be enjoined. 
The government's new mcthod of 
analysis is. however. not inherently pro-
plaintiff. In many ways it was originated 
by (then) Posner and Landes in 19R I.I~ 
Posner and Landes pointed out that if it 
were possible to calculate ela~icity of 
supply and elasticity of demand. we could 
forgo market definition and market share 
because we would know everything we 
needed to know to assess a merger's COI11-
(' () V E R S T () R 
peliti\'c impa\.:1. However. because we 
cannot know this very often. we must 
instead usc the traditional methods of cal-
culating the surrogates of relevantll1arket 
and market shares. and making presump-
tions. 15 
The government's new approach is 
saying. in effect. that enforcers agree with 
Landes's and Posner's overall methodol-
ogy, but that econoJJ1ic theory. econo-
metric techniques. data availability.If' and 
developments in computer simulations 
have improved so much in the last fifteen 
years. we can now often answer Landes's 
and Posner's direct question. In this issue 
of ANTITRUST. Werden suggests that in 
those cases where we can answer the 
direct question and calculate likely price 
increases. we should do that. instead of 
using traditional structural analysis. 
In addition to its pl·ovellance. another 
reason why this apprm.':h is not neces-
sarily pro-plaintiff is that it sometimes 
can be used to weigh in favor of the legal-
ity of a merger under the right circum-
stances. In another recent merger of two 
bread bakeries. for example. one of the 
bakeries specialized in pan bread. while 
the other specialized in hearth bread. 
After an extensive analysis. the 
Department of Justice decided not to 
challenge the merger hecause. among 
othcr reasons. it was shown that the prod-
ucts of the two bakeries were not each 
other's closest competitor in retail sales." 
Accordingly. these recent develop-
ments may provide more bases for 
challenging mergers. hut there docs 
not appear to be an ideological bias 
involved in the government's new 
methodology. 
Disadnmtllges of the Trend 
The new methodologies have a number of 
disadvantages. which may weigh against 
their usc in spite of their lack of ideolog-
ical bias and their widespread support. 
First. there arc often problems with 
obtaining the necessary underlying data 
in a form that is of sufficient quality. IS 
Second. assuming that the data arc 
availahle and reliable. discussions with 
the agencies often turn into a battle of the 
applicahle economic assumptions. econo-
metric analysis. and computer simulation 
models. For example. is the market better 
categorized as homogeneous or difTeren-
tiated. is the firm's competition hased on 
quantity (Cournot gallle-thl~ory mmlelsl 
or price (Bertrand game-theory models). 
or any game theory I1llldel at all'll" What 
docs one assume about the shape of the 
demand curves. the grouping of products 
in a demand system. and the structure of 
the demand estimation process?~" What 
arc the relevant time periods?~1 Which 
simulation model should we use?~~ Is 
product repositioning (a form of entry) 
easy'?:' Virtually all of these models 
always predict prices will rise as a result 
of a merger without any explicitly collu-
sive behavior (absent significant efficien-
cies).~-I Accordingly. what level of pre-
dicted price incro;:ase is sufticientto mcrit 
challcnging a mcrgcr? Different answers 
to these and other technical questions 
may lead to predictions of either a de 
minimis or a significant price increase 
from a mergcr. so the government's 
analysis risks being fragile. 
Spclling out in detail the assumptions 
is very useful, as long as decision makers 
understand the assumptions and their 
importance. However. if one can change 
the analysis substantially by making fair 
hut different assllmptions. or if thc analy-
sis is based on rclatively small difTerences 
in statistical estimates. the government's 
approach is unlikely to be very useful. 
Third. the methodology may be less 
predictable than traditional market defin-
ition analysis. There is clearly uncertain-
ty with both the 1992 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines approach to market definition 
and these recent approaches.~~ However. 
faced with a client that wishes to merge 
with a competitor. a defense lawyer might 
be in a position of saying "it depends on 
the assumptions ahout the shape of the 
demand curve." 
Moreover. it is not clear how often the 
government will he able to l1leet its hur-
den of proof in court given the data and 
methodological issues. The new e\.:o-
nomic approaches being used hy the 
antitrust agencies have not bcen rcally 
tested in litigation. and the courts could 
substantially affect thc influence thcse 
new approachc~ have on mcrger policy 
and analysis.~h Thus. the new unilateral 
effeds analysis may lead to less husiness 
certainty. with all the negatives that flow 
from lower predictahility. 
A fourth drawhack is that this new 
analysis can he time consuming and 
expensive. especiall~' when the mcrging 
E S 
parties attempt to challenge the govern-
ment's analysis or attempt to usc these 
appJ'l'''C !les to dissuade the agencies from 
I:nallenging a merger. It can oftcn cost 
hundreds of thousands of dollars to do a 
complete analysis in a pal1icular case, and 
the analysis moves even more from exist-
ing case law to the realm of economists. 
Pmcticllllmp~,ct on Policy 
One of thc most important practical 
effccts of thc govcrnment's ncw approach 
is that it oftcn can find unilateral anti-
competitive effects at very low combined 
market shares. Jonathan Baker's article 
in this issue of ANTITRUST provides an 
example of how a merger can lead to a 
11.5 percent price increase even though 
the firms' combined market share is only 
10 percent. 
Thus. it should come as no surprise 
that assumptions similar to those con-
tained in the government's models can 
produce many scenarios involving com-
bined market shares of even less than 20 
percent that predict price increases of 
more than 10 percent. In fact. Ihis type of 
analysis can predict price increases from 
6 percent to ovcr 50 percent after the 
merger of two finns that each have only 
5 percent of a hypothetical market. Under 
reasonable assumptions. the new 
approach can predict significant price 
increases with what most would consid-
er small market shares. 
Do the Merger Guidelines permit a 
consideration of unilateral effects when 
the firms' combined market shares is this 
small'! Many in the antitrust hal' helieve 
that the Merger Guidelines contain a gen-
eral safe harbor for uni lateral effects 
when the combined market shares total 
less than 35 percent. hut it is clear from 
Baker's analysis that many of the current 
antitrust enforcers do not believe this. The 
Merger Guidelines state in Sections 1.111 
and 1.11 that there will be no presump-
tion of unilateral effects if the merged 
finn has less than a 35 percent market 
share. but this does not necessarily mean 
that a ~afe harbor exists if there is evi-
dence that the merging finns are each 
other's c\osestcompetitor. 
Is challenging mergers with combined 
market shares of less than 35 perceht 
based on noncollusive theories consistent 
with past enforcement practice'! As a 
practical matter. it represents a dramatic 
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change from the Reagan-Bush years. 
For example, from 1987 to 1992 the Fed-
eral Trade Commission challenged only 
four mergers (out of a total of 61 chal-
lenges) that involved an HHI increase of 
less than 400Y We would be surprised if 
any of the challenged transactions 
involved combined market shares as low 
as 20 percent. 
Our experience suggests that during 
the Reagan years many enforcers 
believed that for a firm to have the power 
to unilaterally raise price and restrict out-
put it would usually have to have more 
than 50 percent of a market, and even in 
those circumstances market power orten 
was negated by case of entry, reposition-
ing. contestability, etc. Now the debate 
has shifted dramatically. The federal 
enforcers are not only concerned with 
market shares over 50 percent, but at least 
some appear concerned with combined 
market shares in the 20-35 percent range. 
Economists differ over whether this 
mirrors the real world. Many economists 
continue to believe that substantial mar-
ket power, when it exists at all. requires 
market shares well over 50 percent."K 
Others believe that market power can 
begin in the 30-40 percent range."" If one 
holds this latter view, the government's 
new policy could be justified by the incip-
iency mandate of Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act-depending on how far the govern-
ment and courts are willing to take these 
theories. 
Testing the New Approach 
in Court 
Ever since Philadelphia Natiollal /Jallk. 
merger enforcement has been moving 
away from a mechanical approach using 
surrogates and presumptions towards one 
that directly attempts to answer the ulti-
mate question of whether price is likely to 
increase because of a merger. This trend 
has been accelerating recently. and it is 
not clear how far the agencies will take it 
or whether a court would ever go all the 
way and forgo the use of market defini-
tion, market share. and concentration. 
In the Department of Justice's failed 
attempt to challenge the acquisition of 
the Parker Pen Company hy the Gillette 
Company, its expert economic witness 
concluded that the merger was anticom-
petitive without including an analysis that 
defined a relevant market.)11 Would a cout1 
now adopt Baker's approach and con-
clude that the price of something is like-
ly to rise hy 12.5 percent. so never mind 
exactly what the relevant market is'! Such 
an approach is contrary to long estah-
lished case law. such as Philadelphia 
Natiollul/Jullk, which holds that it is first 
necessary to define the relevant market 
and caleulate market shares. And, of 
course, the Merger Guidelines would 
have to be amended hecause they now 
assert that the government will start its 
analysis by defining the relevant market. 
If the government is going to test the 
extreme version of its approach in court 
and assert that it did not have to define the 
relevant market or calculate concentra-
tion or market shares, then it should chal-
lenge a merger that is the equivalent of 
Coca-Cola buying Pepsi. This is probably 
the only way the government could con-
vince a court to ignore th' traditional sur-
rogates and find potential harm to a rela-
tively undefined "line of commen:e."" If. 
however, the government's analysis 
hinges on an economic model that shows 
a significant anticol11petitivc effect when 
there is a constant elasticity demand 
curve. but a straight line demand curve 
prediets only a de minimis price increase, 
it is unlikely that any court will hold that 
the government had met its burden of per-
suasion. Accordingly, we would expect 
that this approach would at least initially 
be tested in court in conjunction with a 
traditional structural analysis. 
Clarifying Policy 
We believe that business needs an explic-
it safe harbor from unilateral effects 
analysis. Because a 35 percent post-merg-
er market share does not appear to be a 
safe harbor threshold, and these theories 
have not yet been tested in court, the gov-
ernment should more clearly articulate its 
standards until these theories have been 
litigated. Further. because the new mod-
els almost always predict some price 
increase, it also would be de~irable for 
the agencies to specify what they consid-
er an allowable (or de minimis) predicteu 
price increase. This is particularly imp(,r-
tant because the authors' experiences sug-
gest that the agencies have been reluctant 
to accept any predicted price increase 
resulting from a merger. 
Descriptions of the rationale for bring-
ing specific ca~es, such as Baker's article 
in this issue, are extremely helpful. 
However. it is still difficult to generalize 
from this type of discussion and to pro-
vide a reasonably high level of certainty 
when counseling many prospective merg-
ers, absent extensive and expensive 
analysis .• 
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slMing it has heen highlighled hy the Supreme Court in Illl/o"" (;mlll'. 
1,111. I'. 1l/llII'II (!lui II'il/illll/.WII '1ilblll'I'O COl1', 113 S, Ct. 257H ( 11)9.~), 
II Jonalhan B, Baker. Product Differentiation through Space m1\1 Time: Some 
Antitrust Policy Issues. Presl'ntation to the Antilrust and Trade Regulation 
Commillee of Ihl! Ass'n of Ihl! Bar of Ihe Cily of N,Y, 5-7 (Feb, 6, 11)96). 
"Wilh rl!specllo thl! focus Oil groups of cuslomers, Ihl! recl!nl govenllnl!nl 
approadll!s follow Ihl! 1992 Horiwnlal I\krgl!r Guidelines' analysis of 
markels delined hy Ihe abililY 10 price differenlly 10 dilTerelll groups of 
cuslomcr, SCI' ** 1.12 & 1.22, 
"There is lillie douhllhal Ilmll'lI Shot' was incorreclly dl!cided. hut thl! rea-
sons lilr Ihis arl! nolnecessarily rdaled 10 its hasic approach 10 market def-
inilion, SCI' John L. Peterman. '/1u' Ilmll'IIS/ul(' CIIII', IH J,t. & ECON. 
HI (1975), In some ways, Ilmll'/l Shol"s approach 10 markel ddinilion 
foreshadows Ihe more recl'nl approachl!s of I!slimaling I!laslicilies of 
demand: "The oull!r houndaries of a produl'lmarkel arc dell!nnined by the 
rl!asonahle inlerchangeahililY of use or 11ll' cross-c1asliciIY of dcmand 
helwecn Ihe product ilsl!lf and suhslilUll!s for it." Brown Shoe Co. v, 
Uniled Siales, 370 U.S, 294 (1962). 
"William I.andes & RichardPosm:r. II/lIrkl'll'(I))'/'I' ill tllllilfll.l'l ('w",v, 1)4 
IL\HV. L. REv,9J7 (19HI). 
" /d, at 9JH. 944, 
'''Thl!se dala have coml! from sources such as Nielsen's and IRl's 
scanner-hased price allliquanlily dala on relail sales, 
II Although Iwo producls do nolnecd 10 hI! cach olher's c10scsl t:lllnpelilors 
for Ihe analysb to predicl a price increase, as l'llnsumers plan: more prod-
ucls "in-helween" Ihose of Ihe merging linns. Ihis will lend 10 reduce the 
magnilude of Ihe projecled price inl'rease. SCI' Shapiro, .\/11".11 nole H, The 
Deparlmenl of Juslice appears willing 10 allow u merger hl'low soml! level 
of projl!cled price increase (as yel undclined). 
" For example. scanner data can providl! a greallkal of delailt:d pricl! and 
quanlilY dala hy week, These dala an: noll' vinually always used inmcrg-
I!I'.S involving produl'ls sold al supennarkels and drug slorcs, such as the 
hakcry mergcrs discussed aho\'!! and Ihe rccent mcrger helwel'n Kimlll'rly 
Clark and SCOIt. Unilcd SI;'ICS v. Kimhcrly-Clark Corp .. 19%-1 Trade Cas, 
(CCIl)~171. 405 (N,D, Tex, 19%) (conscnl dcnce). Evcn wilh Ihe avail-
ahililY of Ihese dala, however, Ihere ean hI! slill he prohlems, For exam-
ple. are coupons. returns, and rehall!s accuralcly faclored in'! When scan-
ner dala arc nol availahle, Ihere arc usually suhslanlially more prohlems 
wilh ohlaining accurale price allli 111HUllily dala-although cconomisls 
such as B.lker. Werdcn. and Shapiro ha\'e suggesled ways 10 infer somc of 
lilt! criliL'al informalion, SCI', I',g,. in Ihis issue, Bakcr. Ullilillalli 
('oll/IIt'lilil'" fl/iT!.I· '/1l1'oril'.I' ill M"/:~/'I' ;\ 1111/.1'.1 i.l', il(li'lI Ihis issuc. al 21: 
Werdcn. Sill/llllllillg Llllilllll'l'I/l ('Ollll'l'lilil'l' I:'lli't'/.I.timll /)illi'l'I'lIIillll't! 
l',."dllcl.I' MI'/:~l'r.l', ;,(/i'tl this issue. at 27: Shapiro, J/l1'1'I/ nole H. 
'"The author of a recenl arlicle questioning the increased l'omplexity of el'O-
nomic Iheories quotes thl! eminl'nt Stanford gaml! thl!orisl David Kreps as 
saying, "Noncooperali\'e game 111l:ory , , , has had a greal run in el'llnOIll-
ies o\'er Ihe pasl decade or two, , , WI! (economic theorisls and e/,'onomists 
more broadly) nl!cd to keep a heller sense of proportion ahoul where ami 
when to usc il." John Cassidy, Thl' /ke/illl' '~/'f:'/'II"oll/il'S, NLII' YORKI'll, 
De/,',:!, 19%. OIl J7. 5S, 
"Any projel.'lion of price inL'l'eases after a mergl~r L'an be signiticantly 
affected hy Ihe assumption that Ihl!rl! is a constanl elasticity instead of a 
linl!ar dcmand curvc, A linear lkmand clll'\'e assumes that the quanlil)' of 
demand will fall hy Ihe same amounl for a gi\'en dollar pricl' inL'l'ease, 
regardless of Ihl! currenl le\'el of sales. That is, Ihe dl!L'I'ease in the num-
her of units demanded di\'ided hy a one dollar increasl! in price equals a 
constanl. Constant elaslicilY of demand assumes thai there will hl' a con-
stant p,'n'I'IIllIgl' dl!L'fl!asl! in Ihe quantity demand for a gi\'en/ll'l'I'I'lIltlgl' 
s T () R E s 
increase in pricl!. In general, Enear demand curves lead 10 prl'dictions of 
smaller price incn:ases thanl'llnsl,1II1 elasticity dl'mallli curves, Morl!oVl!r. 
the grouping of products inlo like calegoril!s prior to the economelric 
analysis frequently affects eslinwles of how dosely products competl!. In 
fact. whl'ther the econometric analysis dirl'l'lly eSlimates the c1aslil'ily of 
demand or docs Ihis indirectly Ihrough the impaci of price on markel 
sharl!s can also greally affect the results, 
" Elasticily and linn heha\'ior can also vary greatly ovcr lime, so it is 1,'111-
cial to choose Ihc timl! period l'IllTt'l'lly. 
"Allernaliw simulalion 1Il0deis can giVl! suhslanlially dilTl!rent results, 
C(lIIIIIIII'I' Gregory J. Wl!rden & Lukl! M. Froeh, Sill/llll1lioll 11.1' till 
AIII'flllllil'I' 10 Slrlll'llIl'IIl MagI'/' 1'0lil'Y ill [)WI'rI'IIlitlll'd I'rodllcts 
11II11I.writ'.\'. ill COMI'L'lTt ION POUCY ENIOH('I,~II'NT: TilE ECONOMICS 
01' TilE ANTITRUST PHOCESS (Malm1rn CoatI! & Andrew Kldl I!ds,. 
1996), lI'ilh JelTY Iiallsman cI aI., ('oll/pl'lilil'I' ""tlIY.l'i.I' Idlh [)ifli'r .. lllillll'd 
l'mdllcl.\'. 34 ANNAI.ES IJ'E(,ONOMII' ET Ill' STATISTI()lll' 159 (11)1)4). 
"For I!xampk, if we arc worried aboul a ml!l'!!er of twol'ounlry and wl!sl-
I!rn radio slalions, how difficult would il he for a c1assiL'al radio station to 
rqlOsition ilsdf and enler Ihe counlry ami wl!sll'rn nichl''! Although the 
11)1)2 1I0riwniai I\krger Guidelinl!s would presumahly treat Ihis as 
"uncommitled" entry, and therefore il would he part of the agencil!s' bur-
den of proof in market detinition, "Ihe agency staffs frequenlly Iry 
to place Ihe hurden of proof on thl! advocales of Ihl! merger to show Ihal 
, , , other products should hl' included in the markel share cail:ulations." 
James Langl'nldd, nil' MI'/:~l'r (illidl'/illl',1 m "I'plil,t!, ill Kleit & Coale, 
.1111'/'11 notl! 22, at 41, 46, The recent approadles make this analysis evcn 
morc l'rilical, and there is ongoing research on Ihis issue. SI'I' Gregory 
Werden & Luke Froeh, nil' 1,'III/,r-/III/II";IIg J;fli ... I.I' 1~(Ilori;ollllllllll'/:~I'I',I, 
Paper Prl'sellled OIl thl! AlIlerican Economic Association Mel!ting,~, Nl'll' 
Orleans, La. (Jan, I IN7). 
"These models predici prices will inlTeasl! as Ion!: as Ihere is at least soml! 
suhstilulahililY hetll'een Ihe products of the merging linns (a positive 
cross-elaslil'ily of demand), 
" Atlorneys or husinesspeople mighl have prohkms delining an anlilrusl 
market without exlensiw analysis. hUI mighl haw a good idea ahoul 
which l'Illllpanil!s arc their dosesll'Ompetitors. Under these conditions, il 
is nol cll!ar whl!lhl!r Ihe Jl)l}:! 1I0rilOniai Merger Guidelines or thl! new 
approach would creall! more uncl'rlainly, 
", Onl' case thai has grappled in delail with some of Ihese issues is Nt'\!, lil/'k 
\'. /\/'IIli (;1'11, /-ilod.l', /111' .• 926 F. SUpp. 321 (S.D,N,V. 11)1)5). 
" Alan A. Fisher & Rohert II. Landl" Proposing a Stl1lctured Rl!lilflnulation 
of Ihe Comparatively Unpredictahle 199:! Merger Guidelines, Paper 
Presenled Ikfore the ABA Anlitrust Sl'l,tion Annual Meeting 7-H (Aug. 
I D, 11)92), Only onl! of these challenges involved an 11111 inneasl! of kss 
than JOO. II is un dear whether any of thosl! four challenges involved uni-
laleral effects analysis. 
"SI'I' DENNIS CARLTON & JU'TIU,y PI'Hl.lll+, MOIlERN INlllISlIll,\1. 
OIHiANIZAI'ION HOJ (11)1)·,), 
'" S .... John E. Kwoka . .II' .. nil' /:'!li't'I 4 Mllrkl'l Shllrl' lJiS/rilmlioll Oil 
11II11I,11n' 1'I'I:li"""IIIII'I', 61 REV, E(,ON. & STAT, I. Illi (1979). 
", Uniled Siaies I'. Gillelle Co., I ()9J-1 Trade Cas, (CCII) ~ 70,21 II (D.C. Cir. 
1l)1).~) (Cieorgl! A. RO/anski, Dedaralion in Ihe proposed al:quisilion of the 
Parker Pen Company hy Illl' Ciillelll! Company). 
" By analogy, the alh:mpled monopoli/alion standard in Ihe Ninth Circuil 
used 10 he similar 10 what some el'llnomisls and gOI'CrlllIlenl oflicials arc 
considering in thl! merger area. Lessig v, Tidl!water Oil Co, •. ~ 17 F.:!d 459 
(l)th Cir,), 1'/'1'1. dl'IIil'd, 3'!.7U,S.I)I)J (1 1)64) (inl'el1ain cases market def-
inition is "nol an issue"), Many Shennan Arl * I cases do nol appear to 
require plainliff to prow a Idevant markel and market shall" or markel 
l'oncentralion. As the COlll't noled in SIII'I'I,.,,11/ Sp"rl.I, /111'. I'. MC{!lIiI/IIII, 
IUS, CI. HH4 (19(H), howel'Cr, "single linn aClivity is unlike l'oncel1ed 
al·ti\,ity cOl'ered hy * I, which inherently is fraughl with anticompelilil'l' 
risk, For Ihese reasons, * '2 makes the L'Onduct of a single linn unlaw~1 
only when it actually monopoli/es or dangerously threalens to do so," Id, 
ilt XI)'2 (citalion onlilled), We heliel'C Ihal mergl!r analysis hasl!d on uni-
laleral anlil'llmpetitil'l! effects is more analogous to monopoli/ation analy-
sis than to * I analysis, 
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